Troop contributions to the Afghan imbroglio help define what is meant by the ‘West’:-

• The core group are those countries which have 1,000 or more troops in the country (UK, Germany, Canada, Italy, Netherlands, France, Poland, Australia – all in order of contribution) led by the US providing a full 55% of the troops.
• A secondary group are those providing between 100 and 999 who might be regarded as fellow travellers – in no particular order: Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Portugal, Macedonia, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, Hungary, Latvia, Norway, Romania, Sweden, Lithuania, Spain, Estonia, the Czech Republic, New Zealand and Turkey.
• There is a tertiary group of those just making a gesture under UN auspices with 99 or less – Austria, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iceland, Ireland, Jordan, Luxembourg, Singapore, Slovakia, Ukraine, Slovenia.

What is noticeable about this list is not the dominance of the US (which may be taken for granted) nor the presence of the big NATO and ‘white’ Commonwealth players.

These latter have long helped to define the West as a support system for US leadership because of their Cold War and imperial histories.

Similarly, the fellow traveller role of all the small nations of Europe, but most noticeably Turkey and those entering the EU orbit in the Balkans, is also no surprise. 

Nor is the tentative presence of three former Soviet Republics who together may bring NATO to the very border of the new Russian Empire. What is most noticeable now are the absences and anomalies.

The West Defined By Its Absences

Considering this is a fully UN-sanctioned Mission backed by the most powerful military nation on earth, involvement in the Afghan Project is, in fact, limited to just one network of nations that descends from one ethnic community (the British) and from the anti-Soviet European project.

Outside this zone, which now brings the ‘West’ right up to very edge of the Moscovite sphere of influence and no further, the lack of engagement by former imperial possessions that are not ethnically British in origin is very noticeable.

This does not mean that such states are anti-Western. And, of course, some of the world's oldest independent entities (Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Japan) are well embedded in Western strategic planning. Yet none of these are prepared to engage directly in this West Asian flagship project.

There is no involvement by Latin America, from the Muslim World (other than Turkey and Jordan, the latter a de facto Western subsidiary) or Asia (other than the tiny city-state of Singapore). Japan is supportive but dare not show it too openly for domestic political reasons.

Even within the West, there are nuances – Spain in terms of scale should be working at the same level as the other major European nations and yet, under its socialist government, it remains resistant to doing so.

Despite broadly centre-right governments in the UK, Germany, Italy and France and centre-right political cultures, in global relations terms, in Poland, the Netherlands, Canada and Australia, there is still a large minority of Europeans who are unenthused by American policies.

Such dissent is associated with the real rather than with the ‘ersatz’ centre-left. Similarly, the very quiescence of governments allied to the US but outside the core group indicates a concern that their peoples do not fully share the enthusiasms and analyses of their elites.

A cynic might say that the arrival of true democracy across the world at this time would shrink rather than increase liberal and Western strategic influence and that all we are seeing is a new form of imperial management.

Is the democratic West working the global system through undemocratic viceregal allies? Yes, although that would be a gross oversimplification.

The realist-liberal tension in Western foreign policy lies partly in the recognition that this post-imperial system of management does exist and that it does undercut the West's universalist claims by even accepting that there is a centre and a periphery.

Tensions Within The System

The relative lack of enthusiasm of Austria, Ireland, Iceland, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Slovenia for an Afghan engagement also suggests that some very small states are inclined to maintain their neutralism and to free ride off the others in 'global security' terms.

Perhaps it would be kinder to say that many states within the West have not necessarily bought into the idea that their prosperity and security depends on sustaining the creaky post-Soviet Western quasi-imperial structures that seems to oblige Europeans to fight in Asia and Africa.

These are nuances that might be hidden if the EU developed its own independent defence force much as liberal California might be less likely to send troops to Iraq than, say, Colorado or South Carolina if the US had remained a truly State-driven polity.

Of course, Israel is not providing troops for obvious political reasons. It might reasonably be included as a troublesome outpost but one that is definitely of and in the West – not quite the Crusader State of the Islamists but also not so very different in the long run of history.

If you were to translate all this into map terms and colour it, say, blue – whilst noting that other forms of assistance are given by Japan (and by others such as Pakistan) – then the US zone of 'hard' influence is quite definitely not extending itself much beyond its heartlands.

The West is North America, Australasia and Europe and that’s about it.

Liberals may whinge about the lack of Western values underpinning regimes such as those in Zimbabwe and Burma or of China ‘oppressing’ Tibet but there is no reason why these targets of Western outrage should care too much.

Pivotal states like Mexico, Brazil, Nigeria, South Africa, Egypt, India, Indonesia and China (and, of course Russia which would be a tactless intervention in any case) are noticeable by their absence in Afghanistan.

Such states only very reluctantly support Western universalism if at all when 'failed states' pop up near their borders. The West claims ‘universalism’ with less and less cause to do so in reality rather than ideology.

The ‘West’ is now what remains from the colonial settlement strategies of the three previous centuries and from the detritus of historic resistance (in Europe) to the encroachments of Islam and of the stubbornly irrepressible Russian Empire.

To non-Westerners, the West is either made up of the same old colonialists and imperialists (aka hypocrites) or it is concerned with defences of territory or of economic and cultural dominance that are of no fundamental interest to their twenty-first century developmental targets.

On Universalism

It is commonly accepted that, outside the core zone, many elite groups remain attached to the West for reasons of collective security and economic interest without accepting its ‘universal’ values.

They may even provide very substantial resources for the ‘West’ in its struggles against insurgency – but domestic conditions make it extremely difficult for them to offer the overt help that their security patrons demand.

Frustrations with Saudi Arabia and Pakistan (and others) have often disrupted regional diplomacy in recent years for just this reason.

There are now severe limitations to US influence. These are only going to get more difficult to remove as global inflation cuts into the ‘understandings’ that keep governments from having to deal with mass discontent and uprisings.

A test case recently was the attempt by the US to send an envoy, associated with the Guantanamo operation in the past, to Pakistan. Perhaps this was an attempt to test the boundaries of the acceptable.

The choice seemed crass for a Muslim country with an ambiguous attitude to both the US and the insurgency. The Pakistan Government pointed this out – diplomatically.

The Next President and American Power

How is the next US President is going to handle this situation? The US as an effective force is now restricted to a ‘civilisation’ with boundaries in the Huntington sense. It is Orwell’s Oceania.

The US and its most natural allies are reaching the limits of their expansion as they pacify the Balkans and extend NATO into the Ukraine and Caucasus (if they can). 

Or rather, geostrategically, they can extend power only into zones similar to Afghanistan, reproducing the model of the national socialists whereby the expectation was of permanent guerrilla war to keep the barbarians at bay beyond Europe's 'natural' frontiers.

The West is moving forward because it is on the defensive. It has to halt any rise of the 'real' centre-left within itself, defend boundaries as they settle [Ukraine, Caucasus, Levant] and smash or reform the heartlands of insurgency [effectively, the Muslim poorer classes in Asia and Africa].

It also has to hold allied non-Western elites to the Western economic way to stop them slipping under the protection of others - and, above all, keep the flow of energy and food resources heading in the right direction securely and safely.

These are massive tasks. Placing Hilary Clinton to one side for the moment, Obama and McCain offer radically different potential solutions.

McCain

We might call McCain’s position ‘deep conservatism’. For him and for his western conservative supporters, the answer is not internationalist but Huntingtonian – to strengthen and deepen what holds the West together as a distinctive liberal democratic culture.

From this point, it can then go on the offensive in defence of its values and powers. In short, he would make it in the interest of allies to cleave fast to America through self interest and, if necessary, fear. And yes, this is the precursor to a new Cold War.

It is directed at Russian influence in the context of Europe and Chinese influence in the context of global resource access.

It is also directed at Iran in the context of the defence of those Western frontiers formally and informally set in the Levant, in Iraq and in the palaces of the dictators and dynasts of the Arab world.

It will mean soft power moves against the European and Democrat centre-left, yet more resources poured into counter-insurgent operations. more diplomatic brinkmanship and more chances of direct military clashes between proxies and even principals.

However, it could also mean that the US returns to its position as respected Great Power in precisely the sense understood in the Nixon-Kissinger years. By definition, this means that we might see McCain in Tehran talking turkey with Khatami (not Ahmedinejad) one day.

Obama

We are waiting for Obama to articulate his alternative. Part of his problem is that this alternative is likely to be one that might lose him the US Election if articulated too clearly.

Another paradox of democracy is that the wisdom of crowds is all very well but not when the crowds are getting their information from half-educated journalists and manipulative editors.

Conservatives can, as in China, Iran and Russia or Italy, always rely on national-populism and simplicities to drive less educated or informed centre-ground voters into their camp.

Obama’s team have to talk in generalities and then accept that, in office, they will be faced by brutal reality and depress their more idealistic supporters – much as Kennedy proved to be far less progressive in foreign policy practice than we like to remember.

Some truths remain – the US has to struggle for resources, is the main target of insurgency (often for good reason from an historical perspective), will not abandon Europe to Russia or let Israel be pushed into the sea.

It also has a powerful military and corporate interest committed to the free global market and Obama is no socialist. He is also a lot less radical than we are being led to believe. All these truths limit the ‘change’ we can expect from an Obama Presidency.

However, there is a hard and a soft way of achieving national ends. An Obama Presidency is likely to look at the current state of Oceania and ask why it has to be a fortress instead of a base and why everything has to be done through the threat of blood and mayhem.

And so, while we will still see a lot of blood and mayhem and great power competition, the Obama way may seek to draw a line under the perceived hypocrisies of American democracy operating overseas that have undercut its ability to build support amongst global liberals. 

Extraordinary rendition, the Guantanamo system, the use of torture, the air attacks on civilians and so on are not just 'crimes', they are blunders. A statement that we suspect McCain would agree with even if he drew different conclusions on the balance of hard and soft power.

Obama may try tactics designed to bring the European centre-left into the American tent and negotiate boundaries with other empires so that political competition does not result in military confrontation.

He may drive allies to pay more for their security and economic arrangements with liberal if not democratic reforms.

The Hindsight of History

To historians, the Bush-Cheney administration is going to look like an anomaly but one that sped up an adjustment to changed post-Soviet conditions that might otherwise have taken twenty or thirty rather than six to eight years to effect.

A lot of the pain of an inevitable correction is being suffered in a short sharp burst.

The next President may either be the last gasp of the old ways or the President who sets America on an adjustment to a new phase in its Great Power status, one that might well keep it as ‘top dog’ for at least the first half of this century.

So, two big choices for the American electorate ... assuming Hilary Clinton is eventually knocked out of the race. We have neglected her because we see a Clinton II Administration as representing the triumph of the machine over revitalisation and just more of the same.

A woman who has acted ambiguously over the Iraq engagement, who twists and turns and places the acquisition of power wholly ahead of any fixed sense of principle, is less credible in international relations than the two men who oppose her.

It is nothing to do with gender - it is sad that people still will vote along gender or colour lines without asking whether the person is fit for the office.

America does not need an opportunist. America could certainly do without another four to eight years of drift amongst a squabbling bunch of Washington insiders. But that is a matter for Americans and the rest of us will just have to adjust to their final decision.

Most of the world is probably just happy that the Bush-Cheney Administration is finally exiting after eight years of getting everything wrong that could possibly have been done wrong – whether looked at from a liberal or a conservative realist perspective.

There are political markets within the West and even beyond its boundaries who are ready to support either Obama (from the centre-left but also from the centre-right) or McCain (from the right). All we outside America want is clarity and competence.

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Hezbollah has seized West Beirut and forced the closure of pro-government media - the reasons for the choice of target will become more evident in a moment. There are reports of eleven dead and 'dozens' wounded.

After months of Western media boredom with the umpteenth failure to elect a new President, what is going on in the Lebanon is now becoming of a matter of global interest once again.

What Happened

Hezbollah claimed that the pro-Western Government of Siniora had effectively declared war on it with a couple of measures designed to show the militia who was boss. 

The Government had declared Hezbollah’s telecommunications network to be illegal and unconstitutional and had removed an alleged Hezbollah-linked general from his job as head of security at Beirut airport.

Sunni-led Government and Hezbollah have thus been making strike and counter-strike at their respective technical communications infrastructures. Control of information, access and propaganda is vital to both.

The parallels with Al-Maliki's move on Basra are scarcely coincidental. Perhaps the Government had been watching Al-Maliki’s tactics in Iraq and believed that pressure might be exerted in the same way against its problem militia.

Perhaps months of tension over the Presidency has driven the Sunni Government of Siniora into ever more provocative acts in order to try and bind both internal security and the West into active support for its 'right' to govern.

Al-Maliki used the attacks on Basra and on Sadr City as means to bind the military to the state (by shaking out dissent), recapture control of key economic assets (the ports in the case of Iraq are echoed in the importance of controlling the airport in Beirut) and provoke the militia into wasteful resistance and internal splits.

Hezbollah - The Tougher Nut To Crack

Hezbollah are, however, just that bit hardier and more sophisticated than the Mahdi Army. It is alleged, plausibly, that the Mahdi Army has been learning directly from the organisational sophistication of its older brother.

It is probable that Al-Maliki was acting pre-emptively to halt the inevitable development otherwise of a similar state-within-the-Iraqi-state.

The Mahdi Army and Hezbollah have something else in common. Americans and Sunnis like to present both as creatures of foreign powers - Iran and Syria respectively - but this is nonsense. Allies are not controllers - although I might reconsider that statement in a British context.

Both operations are Shia first but still nationalist second. Neither is keen to see Iran or Syria be more than counterweights to what they see as an imperialist and colonialist Western offensive or occupation. 

So, any attempt to position the Hezbollah as anti-Lebanese in order to bring the military into play and to tip the balance of forces against it is not a certain strategy by any means - and less so than in Iraq in relation to the Mahdi Army.

The Presidency And A Weak State

A strong Lebanese Presidency could work (in Western theory) to integrate Hezbollah into the State as an internally-directed political movement rather than as an externally-directed revolutionary front that threatens Israel.

More to the point, Lebanon with a President is de facto part of the Western camp. Lebanon is effectively neutralized internationally without a President.

General Suleiman is the West’s candidate not because he is pro-Western (in fact, he is more of a Lebanese nationalist) but because it is in the West’s interest to take Lebanon out of its status as political no-man’s land.

Since Suleiman is also ‘candidate for the army’ (the least sectarian institution within the state), the army must also be presumed to be for order and for proper state formation, at least in principle. But it is also vulnerable to its own internal sectarian pressures.

The military had not moved in support of the Government at the time of writing, other than to act like a UN peacekeeping force to guard buildings seized by Hezbollah.

The situation is thus not directly comparable with Al-Maliki’s where the purpose was the capture of an unstable military for the Government interest. 

The Lebanese Army is not only retaining its factional neutrality – so far – it is becoming positioned as the arbiter between both Government and militia and defender of the nation against both Israel and Syria. 

It has even warned in effect that the Government’s brinkmanship (though not cast in these terms) contains dangers to military unity.

Lebanese national feeling may be resistant to Syrian interference or to ‘Greater Syrian’ sentiment but its most recent concern has been the fact of Israeli incursion. In the real world, Syria is a political but not such a military threat as Israel and the Army does not deal in 'politics'.

Hezbollah's Calculations

Hezbollah was thus an effective barrier to Israeli occupation, so the idea that the weakening of Hezbollah is in the Lebanese national interest may be self-evident to the Sunni elite and its Western allies but it is far from self-evident to some nationalists, including some in the Army.

The Lebanization and de-Iranisation of Hezbollah is a common goal of all nationalists but the means adopted to do this may well differ. It could be an own goal if the country is handed over to a Maronite-Israeli-French colonial administration in all but name.

In the event, Hezbollah acted with the grim determination that makes it such a heroic organisation in the eyes of the so-called Arab street, especially in this sixtieth anniversary year of the Naqba [the Palestinian catastrophe].

Initially, it resisted provocation (following tactics similar to those of Al-Sadr in Iraq) but when it acted, it acted decisively.

The same calculations must apply amongst Hezbollah politicians as they do within the Mahdi Army – how far to extend a mode of defence to one of attack and what a response to a provocation might mean for Iran and Syria. The Hezbollah response was thus very finely tuned.

The widespread fear is that the US and Israel will look for a chance to do something military to boost McCain in the forthcoming US Election, especially as Obama now looks increasingly likely to push an almost obsessively power hungry Hilary Clinton into second place.

The sheer energy of the resistance of the 'machine' to Obama suggests that powerful forces really do not want Obama as President any more than they once did Bobby Kennedy.

Though assassination is probably passé, it is reasonable to see the US' power ‘to do things’ overseas as being linked to the management of the democratic process at home. This is not conspiracy theory, just how things work.

Government Motivations

But back to Lebanon. Whatever calculations were going on in Washington and Tel Aviv (or Paris and London), Lebanese politics possesses its own momentum.

Even the most pro-Western Lebanese are deeply unwilling to see the country become a wasteland just to assist regional Great Power chess moves against one another.

Did Siniora’s Government place pressure on Hezbollah not to declare war but only to imply the possibility of a Western-backed war and extract Hezbollah's compliance with the real concern of the Western camp – the election of General Michel Suleiman as President?

This interpretation makes sense. Despite the rhetoric and the 'invasion' of Western Beirut, all parties seem to be prepared to use violence but only tactically. 

They are, in fact, operating in a restrained way, employing the rules of a finely tuned political game that can look scary in print and could get out of hand - but which is also carefully calibrated to get tactical rather than strategic advantage.

Nevertheless, this crisis does have qualities that suggest that a degree of brinkmanship on both sides is taking things further than the system may bear and one new factor is the emergence of economic problems into the 'mix'.

The Labour Unions Emerge As Players

Lebanon saw a general strike this week. High inflation, general in the region, has resulted in workers demanding very high wage increases. Government action to increase the national minimum wage was regarded as insufficient by the General Labour Confederation.

The strike, which Hezbollah decided to back with its formidable manpower by sealing off the airport, added to political tensions. The Government's moves might even be regarded as a sectarian provocation expressly designed to pre-empt a non-sectarian class alliance.

We are seeing the potential for a new alliance, albeit in its very early stages, between Islamist welfarist ‘street’ networks and organized labour.

Following patterns elsewhere in the world, such an alliance (similar to that between socialists and labour unions in Europe during its own industrial-developmental phase) would be of enormous potential import.

However, labour unions remain suspicious of Islamist influence. Worker and Islamist (essentially petit-bourgeois and economically conservative) concerns are far from identical. Secular trades unionists may justifiably fear Sharia culture as much as trades unions rightly feared Bolshevism. 

But class interest will tend to appear in times of economic crisis and the entire Muslim world is finding that inflation is destabilising the social structure.

Neo-Socialism - Western Liberalism's Worst Nightmare

We may also be underestimating the ideological effect of such bilateral dialogue as that between Venezuela and Iran (affecting in turn militia like Hezbollah and the Mahdi Army and even Hamas).

Redistributionist quasi-militarised strategies operating against corporate and bourgeois interests can, by removing the historic deadweight of Marxism, link up with conservative populist appeals in support of both the identity as well as the economic needs of the poorest in society.

This neo-socialism is every Atlanticist liberal's worst nightmare - a genuinely popular merger of identity politics and redistributionism. Too easily positioned as 'fascism', it is nevertheless not liberal.

The food crisis and inflation thus represents an interesting political opportunity for the labour movement to get both ‘bourgeois’ elites (like the Siniora Government) and radical networks (like Hezbollah) to bid for its support.

We have to use the Marxist term 'bourgeois' because it expresses precisely what we are talking about - local business and higher level professional networks integrated with the international marketplace.

These networks have to find ways to reassert sectarianism lest their own supporters find class a more interesting binding force than identity. This alone might trigger a move against Hezbollah just to remind the Sunni working class that it should not sup with the devil.

Lebanon and Egypt Compared

Of course, bourgeois elites are bourgeois because they believe in fiscal rectitude and Islamists, like Bolsheviks, have no long term interest in truly free trades unions. So the politics of all this are extremely volatile.

The three main players (Sunni middle classes, organised working class and Shia community) collaborate and compete with a fourth player, the military commitment to state security, and with a fifth, persistent foreign influence (notably Western soft power but also Syria) added to this frothy mix.

That this is not a problem just for Lebanon becomes clear when we look at Egypt. Just as Egypt has partially responded to union demands so the Lebanese tried unsuccessfully to do the same.

The Lebanese unions wanted a tripling in the minimum wage to over $600pm but the Government only offered $333 (still an increase from $200) – so militancy seems to have some determined political aspect underpinning it. It is about economics but not just about economics.

A general strike against a weakened state that is no position to ‘fire into the crowd’ and disperse demonstrators provides an opportunity for political recalibration as it might do in any number of other regional states where Islamists are struggling against more powerful state mechanisms.

Egypt should be the West’s greater concern because the situation had become so serious that the Government bought off the State apparat with inflationary salary increases that are likely to increase rather than diminish the anger of those outside the system.

The Egyptians increased fuel and tobacco prices and vehicle licence fees to pay for public sector pay rises. They are claiming (not very plausibly) that recent increases in public pay will only result in a 0.5% inflation increase.

This indicates the necessary commitment to ‘fiscal rectitude’ but it will also fuel inflation and partially redistribute the pain from public sector workers (presumably the apparat on which the regime depends for survival) to the struggling and smaller end of the private sector.

The difference between Lebanon and Egypt is the difference between a weak state and a strong state - strong 'bourgeois' states offer few opportunities for working class and 'petit bourgeois' (aka Islamist) revolt.

The threatened day of action in Egypt prior to these Government fixes over pay fizzled out quite quickly.

It was one of those Facebook non-events that we have now come to expect – like protests against Burma or Tibet, media-friendly but ultimately meaningless because they are not backed up by adequate physical organization on the ground.

But the principle stands that the Muslim Brotherhood and labour unions who have been getting angry for different reasons inside Egypt might be bound together by a specific anger over inflation in staple products as things get worse. 

Hence, the current geo-political panic over inflation. 'It's the politics, stupid'.

Back to Lebanon

As we write, having captured West Beirut, Hezbollah is challenging the State to remove its roadblocks to the airport. It promises a campaign of civil disobedience if this week’s decisions are not reversed.

The airport represents the economic lifeblood of the wealthy business elite of the country while the independent telecommunications network of Hezbollah is a key strategic asset in any resistance to another incursion by Israel.

Hezbollah rightly suspect Western pressure on Siniora to ‘deal with’ strategic infrastructures that advantage Hezbollah in its resistance strategies. Capturing telecomms and re-capturing the airport is analogous to Al-Maliki's investment in capturing the ports.

However, the actual rather than the potential extent of the crisis could be exaggerated.

It is not in the union interest to destabilize the country but merely to demand a greater share of the increasing prosperity amongst the middle classes (despite political instability) at a time of rapid inflation. Hezbollah remains fundamentally defensive at this stage.

Like the Mahdi Army, Hezbollah is under attack rather than being the aggressor. We would do well to remember this. Lebanon may be lurching in small escalations to some sort of definitive crisis in which the West is, sadly, playing a provocative role.

To Washington, Paris, London and Tel Aviv, Lebanon is merely a front in the war against Iranian influence. Civil war is not yet (just) on the cards but the situation is not a comfortable one for those few who care about civilian lives in a small country on the West's Eastern frontier.

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NEWS: City of London & GCC Conference brings together key players in international financial markets

The Middle East Association (MEA) in partnership with the City of London Corporation will be staging the third annual City and Gulf Co-operation Council Countries (GCC) Conference at the Merchant Taylor’s Hall in London on Thursday 19 June 2008.

For the third year running, this premier event will bring together key players from within the financial communities of the City of London and the GCC countries.

Lead sponsors this year include Bahrain Economic Development Board, Qatar Financial Centre Authority and National Bank of Dubai.

This year the keynote address will be delivered by The Rt Hon The Lord Mayor of The City of London Alderman David Lewis, with other high profile government and financial sector representatives from the UK and GCC addressing the Conference.

The main areas of focus at this year’s Conference include:

• Regulation and risk-based supervision in the context of the global credit crunch: GCC and London perspectives
• Building strong foundations for GCC growth: the financing and skills challenge
• Growing global impact of Islamic finance and insurance: UK and GCC synergies
• GCC investment flows to third markets and role of sovereign wealth funds

Jason Peers, Chairman of the MEA GCC region, commented:

“The City and GCC Countries Conference has established itself as a key element in the flourishing relationship between the City of London and the markets of the GCC. Discussions at the Conference will be even more relevant this year, given the rapidly changing relationship between the major global economies and financial institutions, and the increasingly powerful and self confident economies and institutions in the Gulf.”

He added: “With Western economies experiencing a financial correction and an increasing volume of capital coming from emerging markets, global interdependence is becoming even more important. This Conference allows senior finance professionals to look to the Gulf economic markets for long-term stability and growth.”

“The Conference will bring together the dynamism of the Gulf within the maturity of the City of London,” said Michael Thomas, Director General of the Middle East Association. “It will be an excellent and high-level networking opportunity.”

ENDS

Notes to Editors :

1. The Middle East Association (MEA) is the UK’s premier organisation for promoting trade and relations with the Middle East, North Africa, Turkey and Iran. Its members cover all sectors of industry and commerce including: Banking, Financial, Law, Consultancy, Manufacturing, Retail, Education and Training, and are responsible for the vast majority of all UK investment and trade with the region.

2. Conference Lead Sponsor - Bahrain Economic Development Board:

The Bahrain Economic Development Board is a dynamic public agency with overall responsibility for formulating and overseeing the economic development strategy of Bahrain, and for creating the right climate to attract direct investment into the Kingdom. Bahrain Financial Services is a department of the Economic Development Board that is uniquely dedicated to the needs of the financial services industry. Its role is to increase the international profile of Bahrain as a leading financial and business destination and to provide a single point of contact for international financial services firms looking to build a base in the Kingdom.

3. Conference Lead Sponsor - Qatar Financial Centre (QFC) Authority:

The QFC Authority is the commercial, administrative and legislative body of the QFC which is responsible for driving its commercial strategy, developing its commercial laws and forging relationships with the global corporate community and other key institutions both within and outside of Qatar. The QFC is a financial and business centre established by the Government of Qatar and located in Doha. It has been designed to attract international financial services institutions and major multi-national corporations and to encourage participation in the growing market for financial services in Qatar and elsewhere in the region.. The QFC was created by Qatar Law No.(7) and has been open for business since 1 May 2005.

4. Confirmed speakers include:

• The Right Honourable The Lord Mayor of The City of London Alderman David Lewis
• Sir David Walker, Senior Adviser, Morgan Stanley
• Baroness Symons of Vernham Dean, Special Representative on Saudi Arabia to the Prime Minister and Vice President, Middle East Association
• Richard Thomas, Managing Director, Global Securities House & Chair, UK Advisory Sub-Committee on Islamic Finance
• Michael Ainley, Foreign Banks Regulator, UK Financial Services Authority
• Stuart Pearce, CEO & Director General, Qatar Financial Centre Authority
• Robert Ainey, Chief Executive, Bankers Society of Bahrain

[Pendry White, subsidiary of TPPR, is acting as media relations adviser to the Conference through the Middle East Association]

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