The fighting in Lebanon appears to have halted everywhere except Tripoli.  The struggle has cost some 80 lives, nearly half in the mountains where the Druze put up more of a fight than the Sunnis.

Prime Minister Siniora gave a telephone interview to the Financial Times on 13 May but added little new other than to sustain the usual claim that Syria and Iran were behind Hezbollah’s actions in West Beirut.

His ‘pitch’ is to try and present Hezbollah as anti-Lebanese but somehow it rings hollow as sufficient explanation for what has happened. Siniora also seemed to admit that he had miscalculated. 

The attempt to blame Iran for the Hezbollah coup is intensifying. The claim is led from Saudi Arabia which is acting as the West's vanguard against the Syria-Iran axis in Lebanon. Our view remains that this targeting of Iran as ‘responsible’ is simplistic.

The claim underestimates the political sophistication of Hezbollah as an independent faith-based nationalist movement of the relative poor. Damascus and Tehran are only adopting such movements as allies for reasons of convenience based on their own isolation.

We have seen similar claims over the Mahdi Army and these certainly do not stand up to much scrutiny.

The purpose behind the Saudi move (which also reflects US and UK attempts to blame Iran for disruption in Iraq and for Israel to blame Iran not only for backing Hezbollah but also, albeit making the claim more tentatively, Hamas) is largely propagandistic.

The 'West' has to hold the line amongst the Sunni poor against any attempt to shift political emphasis from sectarian to class or national resistance issues. The best way to do this, it has concluded, is to go on the offensive (as it has done by backing the Awakening in Iraq).

Battle lines have been drawn up in Palestine, Lebanon and Iraq with external powers forming two armed camps – both on the defensive but both believing that tactical attack is now the only form of defence available.

This pattern seems to be repeated in North East Africa with Somalia in contention between similar camps and the unfolding of a separate proxy war between Chad and Sudan.

Only Afghanistan operates according to different rules with a Western alliance unable to drive Pakistan towards a more vigorous practical engagement in victory against insurgency and Iran avoiding any confrontation with NATO directly. Iran does not want a 'war' on two fronts.

Yet Iranian influence is certainly growing and it is threatening the satisfactory conclusion to the ‘other’ major concern of the Western allies in the Levant - progress on the Peace Process.

While Ahmedinejad’s statement that Iran is the only country not interfering in Iran can be discounted as deliberately naive, the truth is that a lot of countries are getting involved – not only Iran and Syria but Saudi Arabia itself, the US and France.

Part of Western frustration is that it does not control the actions of the Lebanese Army. 

This is possibly the only genuinely independent or non-aligned force in the country and one that will work with Hezbollah when necessary to meet its primary directive, the defence of the Republic against invasion from anywhere.

All things being equal, its officer cadre would probably be more inclined to the West than the East. 

The US thus dangles the prospect of resources and funds for an organization that not only has sectarianism to contend with in its own ranks but also barely sufficient resources to do the limited task assigned to it. It cannot defend Lebanon against Israel without Hezbollah's help.

There is a bigger picture here. US strategy in the Cold War was to work through national military networks against insurgent or centrifugal tendencies within the rising nation states.

The US would as support national integralism against imperialism on the one hand and against communism and regionalism on the other. Turkey, Pakistan and Indonesia are typical examples.

On the down side, the whole business degenerated into selective mass murder in parts of Latin America. The great failure of course was to believe that the South Vietnamese military could stand against Giap’s Viet Minh.

Now this time-worn strategy is re-emerging in an asymmetrical warfare context, certainly in the maintenance of alliances with the military in pivotal states like Pakistan (albeit with more democratic gloss).

There is also the concentration of effort on financing, training and re-constructing national armies in Iraq and (much less successfully) in Afghanistan.

From this perspective, switching the Lebanese Army from neutralism to the Western camp along Pakistani lines must be a key strategic aim of the Western Powers whose primary concern is to build strong states in the region that can deal directly with insurgency and local militia.

Hezbollah are fully aware that the Saudis, French and Americans will do all their power to crush it. Increasing the strength of the Lebanese Army, promoting pro-Western officers and weeding out ‘left-nationalist’ officers is part of the West's and the Hariri Government’s strategy.

Indeed, the current crisis was partly precipitated by the attempt to remove an allegedly pro-Hezbollah army officer from a significant strategic position.

The issue has now moved beyond diplomacy. Visits by Arab diplomats are on the edge of useless. The most likely next stage is that the West, in its desperation, will compound the problem by arming pro-government (Sunni and Maronite) forces.

Many analysts believe that such a strategy is more likely to bring about a civil war than a strengthening of the State.

Similar arguments have been made about the wisdom of arming Sunni insurgent operations in Iraq. The jury is still out on whether the Awakening has contributed to the strengthening and stabilization of the Iraq state or merely raised the ante on further bloodshed.

All in all, Lebanon is very close now to being considered a 'failed state' and it is only the balance of forces presented by two armed camps of powers that prevents a direct intervention by a proxy for either Iran or the West.  Dangerous times!

http://www.tppr.co.uk