The Pakistan State of Emergency, in fact a ‘coup’, is not entirely a surprise. The Financial Times calls it a ‘desperate power grab’. The ostensible trigger was the expectation of a negative Supreme Court judgement on Musharraf’s re-election.

The ruling elite, notably the political leadership of the PML-Q, understandably thought that a move before the Supreme Court decision would be a lot less damaging than being forced into making one after the result. This was also their chance to put Bhutto on the defensive. The PML-Q is the nationalist Party in Pakistan and, as we shall see below, the State of Emergency is ruffling feathers in London and Washington.

The situation in Pakistan is very serious but, although some analysts are talking about ‘brink of civil war’, it is far too early to talk about any loss of the monopoly of force. Musharraf believes that the State of Emergency was required precisely to forestall such a loss, to reassert State power before it was whittled away beyond control by a combination of legal challenges, political factionalism, Islamist terrorism and ethnic centrifugelism.

The Americans and the British have been embarrassed in public. It is probable that Western aid will be suspended if the elections process is not restored within two or three months. However, we urge caution before taking any outrage entirely at face value. 

Musharraf’s 'coup' (if temporary) might rather suit some Western strategists. Admiral Fallon of US Central Command was in Islamabad just before the declaration of the emergency. The Guardian front page report today does not require a genius to see that what was being said between the British and Pakistanis privately is not necessarily what the British would like you to believe was said.

The Pakistanis certainly seemed to think that the West is more relaxed than its public statements imply. The West denies this. Reading between the lines, the West seems to be saying one thing diplomatically (“go do it if you must but keep your promises on eventual elections and de-militarisation”) and another thing publicly (“shock and shame”).

It is equally important to note what is actually being said by the prime movers in these cases not just what is laundered to the public by officials. Musharraf’s broadcast to the nation on Saturday emphasized the demoralization (this English word was used more than once) caused to the executive authority in Islamabad by the constant legal activity against the Government. He also spoke of threats to the integrity of the nation from ‘extremists’, Islamist and presumably liberal as well.

The Army is believed to be on side. The PML-Q is to the military what Sinn Fein was to the IRA. If the very pro-US and Bhutto-sympathetic new C-in-C-designate has signed off on this manouevre, then we should be very cautious in assuming that the West and Bhutto are too surprised or even panicked by the turn of events.

However, this is a situation ready to be mishandled. Local analysts suggest that street protests will build up (the first riots have started on cue) and we assume that the Bhutto, Sharif and Islamist factions will all be keen to capture the leadership of any grassroots movement if it appears to get legs.

Lawyers and opposition personnel have been arrested. The longer that they stay in custody, the more impossible it becomes to hold back Western media and political (and, in the UK, ethnic constituency) resentment. NGOs will mobilize. Outrage in the Financial Times is only the beginning. A point of no return may be when the Army has to fire into a crowd.

The Army has also been divided by the ‘reforms’ of the C-in-C -designate. He it was who purged the Islamist element in the wake of 9/11 - and had probably previously shared the post-Nairobi bombing assessment of the US that the ISI was nurturing a decidely dodgy ally by supporting Islamist irregulars. Yet some sort of deal seems to have allowed this 'coup' to temporarily ignore the insurgents in the North West and to concentrate attention on the weaker player in the game, making it apparently an action targeted primarily at the liberals.

Rhetoric may be directed at Islamists but the initial wave of activity seems to have been directed at lawyers, liberals, the media and political opponents. The Islamists were temporaily neutralized through negotiations and ceasefires, a fact noticed by human rights campaigners just as they went under siege. Militants released 48 captured Pakistani troops amidst stories that this was part of a wider exchange programme (which would really upset the Americans).

As for the Army, the surrendering soldiers will probably be court-martialled, which is divisive in itself. Many in the Army are at best unsure and at worst resentful of the value to Pakistan of acceding to Western pressure to engage in an unpopular war in Afghanistan. If, as we believe, the military and political elite remain interested in crushing insurgency (albeit for nationalist rather than liberal reasons), then the degree to which the Army is united in the same analysis of threat as the West becomes critical. From this perspective, Musharraf may even gain by earning some public opprobium from the West.

So, are elements in the West complicit with the ‘coup’ on the basis that only a strong State can organize matters for the suppression of Islamism and the continuation of the national modernisation strategy? The most sensible interpretation is that the West does not like what has happened and considers it ill-advised, but still sees Musharraf as their man.

Equally Musharraf has a flexible approach to dealing with insurgency that, in itself, creates its own tensions with the West. The immediate problem for the West is largely one of public relations and of keeping a tight grip on the Pakistani administration's new vulnerability to giving ground to domestic anti-Western sentiment.

One way to interpret events is to see the elimination of liberal political dissent as the necessary precursor to strengthening the state for an eventual war on Islamists and regional rebellions. Even temporary appeasement of some tribal leaders may be merely a means to an end whereby the full force of Pakistan's monopoly of force can be concentrated on the hardline recalcitrants once they have been detached from their tribal sympathisers. 

The West may find all this embarrassing, but Musharraf and the Army almost certainly fear a ‘stab in the back’ from the liberal elite as they go to war against insurgency. A war on two fronts could certainly descend into civil war and we must not forget that the PML-Q's own raison d'etre is partly traditionalist and Islamist as well as nationalist and anti-communist.

In our view, we should be very careful of assuming too much until the next ten days have indicated just how long liberal lawyers will be held in custody and whether the Islamists open up a second front. Then, there will be a period into the New Year during which we will see whether protests become unmanageable, whether Musharraf can cobble together a more workable ‘less liberal’ re-democratisation process, whether Bhutto can steer her way through this mess and, finally, whether the Army can stay united on both maintaining power and on specific policies in relation to Afghanistan and Waziristan.

As for the West (essentially the US and the UK in this context), its need to be publicly condemnatory for ‘ethical foreign policy’ reasons is in conflict with its quiet pragmatic approval of anything that strengthens the State in the assault on Islamist insurgency. Again, remember the real driver forthe West at this time - the need to prepare the ground for the 2008 Spring Offensive against the Taliban.

The West needs to be reassured that Musharraf is in full command of his Army, intends to continue sooner rather than later with national liberalization, holds the liberals in custody for hours or days rather than weeks or months - but, above all, has not abandoned the alliance against radicalized Islamism.

Musharraf has probably had enough of complicated and domestically damaging Western manouevres that were designed to ensure sufficient Western democratic cover to please the constituents of his allies (not his constituents) in a war not of his choosing and that is causing difficulties in maintaining the cohesion of his political base.

What may have ‘gone down the tubes’ is the carefully constructed Western strategy for integrating the Bhutto Party into the Pakistan political system both as a means of transiting towards liberal democracy and of undermining the military-Islamist network that underpins PML-Q nationalism. The PML-Q hardliners are not fools and undoubtedly saw that, since liberals threatened to undermine their hold on power, then a 'coup' could deal with two problems - the presumption of domestic liberals and excessively 'pushy' Western support for Bhutto. 

Bhutto, who has had her popularity badly shaken by time and compromises, now has to go with the resistance to Musharraf or eventually back him ‘on his promises’. We are privately advised that Musharraf did Bhutto (and so the West) a favour by removing a Supreme Court that was, it is rumoured, on the edge of removing her promised immunity from prosecution.  It was noted that she was in Dubai and so safe from arrest until the State of Emergency when she found it easy to get through Karachi airport while her rival Sharif's pals were being placed under arrest.  It would be easy to get into conspiracy theory under these conditions.

If this is so, then Musharraf may have pre-empted an equally bad crisis with Pakistani police sent in by the Supreme Court to arrest Bhutto on corruption charges. A Bhutto in court and going through a lengthy trial process would truly have unravelled a strategy for liberalisation that increasingly looks as if it is still on track in the minds of its proposers.

In this sense, Musharraf’s coup is both against the liberal element in the West and an attempt to preserve the space for future liberalisation. The Western military may not give such a damn about liberal values so long as the War on Terror can be pursued with more vigour as a result of the 'coup'. There is now going to be some desperate policy in-fighting and factional negotiations over the coming hours and days of which we shall know nothing.

But even though we believe that Musharraf is being cruel to be kind to Western ambitions, Western liberalizers are now in a real bind. They are only interested in Pakistan because it is a quasi-liberal front-line state in a war on even more illiberal forces. They are going to have to choose whether to make an enemy of the only force capable of crushing Islamist militancy (and, even then, doubtfully so) or bring their ‘ethical foreign policy’ and the promotion of human rights and the rule of law (let alone democracy) into disrepute. Worse, they be forced to back a partially discredited Bhutto in a fake political conflict with Musharraf where the General holds all the cards.

Once again, the two wings of Western foreign policymaking, realist and idealist, are having to face the internal contradictions implicit in trying to run soft empires – do you back viceroys or do you try and rule directly through a liberal revolution? Our bet is that realism will dictate that this viceroy is backed in private and that the West will do everything it can to make-believe that Bhutto is a credible democrat in public.

All diplomatic efforts will now concentrate on finding a way to get Musharraf back into the liberal camp sufficiently to ensure that the US Congress and UK Parliament do not start to interfere and that, in the UK, campaigning does not start up once again against the Western alliance from within a key ethnic migrant constituency. Interesting times.

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